Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Brandom on Meaning Change - Dictionary of Arguments
I 670 Change of concept/Change of meaning/QuineVsFeyerabend: Solution: The semantically relevant is not the meaning but the reference. >Meaning, >Reference. What we want to represent, and not what we say about it - the extensional content is communicated - even from a Zoroastrian you can find out whether the sun is shining. - Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter then. Instead, there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible worlds. >Extensions, >Possible worlds. I 671 Content/Concept change/Scheffler/Boyd/Putnam: content is no longer viewed as inferential role: inference can be re-introduced at two levels. >Content, >Inferential role, >Inferential content. a) some inferential accuracies can be read from inclusion relations between the extensions of predicates b) insight into the relativity of extensions against various context elements leads to a new concept of intensions: Definition intension: functions of indices to extensions! >Intensions, >Extensions. A more robust type of content that is at best shared by the audience. (BrandomVs). Scheffler/Boyd/PutnamVsFeyerabend: Progress as talk of more and more objects that bring more and more predicate extensions into play). - Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter - instead there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible world. I 671f Inferential contents as functions/Change of concept: possible solution: ordered pairs of circumstances and consequences of the use. >Use, >Circumstances. Advantage: It would not be necessary to always admit that the meaning of the word changes with every new belief. BrandomVs: cannot explain why one intension and not the other is now associated. I 673 Problem: functions can only be constructed by arguments which are beyond behavioral dispositions. Change of concept/Intensional theory/BrandomVs: not easy to show: e.g. that the early theorists used "electron" intensionally in a way that allowed plenty of room for our rethinking. QuineVs: reference instead of meaning! (see above)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Brandom
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Change
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27